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Grodin: Labor Relations

Labor Relations
by Joseph R. Grodin*
One of my colleagues, upon hearing of this endeavor, asked
how I could write a chapter on developments in California
labor law when there aren't any. Presumably, what he meant
was that the field is so occupied by federal regulations that
there is little room for development on a state level. His point,
though exaggerated, is well taken.
The Labor Management Relations Ace covers a broad
range of activities which affect interstate commerce, declaring
some to be protected and prohibiting others as unfair labor
practices, and vests the National Labor Relations Board with
jurisdiction to make determinations and provide remedies.
According to the pre-emption doctrine as declared by the
United States Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the NLRB
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is exclusive, in both substance and remedy. Whenever an
activity is "arguably" protected or prohibited by the federal
act, courts (both state and federal) must yield. 2 Since there
are few matters in the labor field which are not reasonably
arguable, the pre-emptive effect is substantial.
The LMRA does vest federal courts with original jurisdiction in certain matters, principally the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements under section 301 3 and the
provision of damages for certain unfair labor practices under
section 303. 4 State courts are held to exercise jurisdiction concurrently.5 In suits brought in state courts under section 301,
the courts are bound to apply principles and precedents of
federallaw,6 subject to Supreme Court review. 7 Thus, within
the perimeters of the LMRA, for both jurisdiction and substantive rules, federal law predominates.
This does not mean, however, that developments in labor
law at the state level are without significance. It is state
courts which must determine their jurisdiction in particular
cases, and, subject to Supreme Court review, such decisions
playa major role in shaping the extent and application of
the pre-emption doctrine. With respect to those cases in
which they may assert concurrent jurisdiction with federal
courts, state courts are frequently called upon to exercise
judicial creativity on questions where federal principles,
though theoretically applicable, are virtually nonexistent. s
2. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 3 L.Ed.2d
775, 79 S.Ct. 773 (1959).
3. The union party to the agreement
must be one which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in the act.
4. Section 303 incorporates by reference section 8(b)(4) of the Act, which
makes it all unfair labor practice for a
union to engage in certain activity, principally secondary boycotts and jurisdictional (work assignment) disputes.
These are the only unfair labor practices for which the Act provides judicial
relief through damage suits.
5'40
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5. See McCarroll v. Los Angeles
County District Council, 49 Ca1.2d 45,
315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. den. 355
U.S. 932, 2 L.Ed.2d 415, 78 S.Ct. 413.
6. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No.
735, 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. [1967])
cert. granted 389 U.S. 819, 19 L.Ed.2d
68, 88 S.Ct. 103 (1967), affd. 390 U.S.
557, 20 L.Ed.2d 126, 88 S.Ct. 1235.
7. Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95, 7 L.Ed.2d 593, 82 S.Ct.
571 (1961); Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U.S. 502, 7 L.Ed.2d 483, 82 S.Ct.
519 (1961).
8. The Supreme Court has said:
"The range of judicial inventiveness will
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Finally, there are situations and areas in which neither the preemption principles nor the judiCial uniformity principle preclude the application of state law by state courts or agencies.
This may be the case, for example: (1) where the impact upon
interstate commerce is so slight that the NLRB has declined
to assert jurisdiction or has indicated by published rule or
decision that it would decline;9 (2) where the particular
employment relationship is excluded from coverage under
the Act (as with farm laboeo and public employees); or (3)
where the subject matter is deemed to be of "merely peripheral
concern"ll of the Act but of substantial concern under state
policy, such as the regulation of violence or mass picketing,
or in litigation over exclusively internal union affairs.12
Application of the Pre-Emption Principle
In earlier years, perhaps the principal contribution of the
California courts to the pre-emption doctrine was in providing
opinions which the United States Supreme Court struck down
in the landmark Garmon 13 cases. Recently, however, California courts have fully accepted the implications of the prebe determined by the nature of the
problem. . . . Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not
state law. . . . But state law, if
compatible with the purpose of § 301,
may be resorted to in order to find the
rule that will best effectuate the federal
policy. . . . Any state law applied,
however, will be absorbed as federal law
and will not be an independent source
of private rights." Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 at
457, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 at 981, 77 S.Ct.
912 at 918 (1957).
9. The NLRB has statutory authority
to assert jurisdiction over unfair labor
practices which "affect commerce", a
term interpreted as coincident with the
constitutional authority of congress to
regulate interstate commerce. NLRB
v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 83 L.Ed.
1014, 59 S.Ct. 688 (1938). It also has

statutory authority by rule of decision
or published rules to decline to assert
jurisdiction where it feels the impact
upon commerce is "not sufficiently substantial." LMRA § 14(c)(1). State
courts and agencies are free to assert
jurisdiction over cases so declined.
§ 14(c)(2).
10. LMRA § 2(3).
11. LMRA § 2(2).
12. For a recent statement of the
"peripheral concern" exceptions, see
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 17 L.Ed.2d
842, 87 S.Ct. 903 (1967).
13. Garmon v. San Diego Building
Trades Council, 45 Cal.2d 657, 291
P.2d 1 (1955), revd, and remanded
353 U.S. 26 1 L.Ed.2d 618, 77 S.Ct.
607 (1957), 49 Cal.2d 595, 320 P.2d
473 (1958) overruled 53 Cal.2d 475 (on
remand) revd. 359 U.S. 236, 3 L.Ed.2d
775, 79 S.Ct. 773 (1959).
CAL LAW 1969
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emption principle, and some of the decisions break new
ground. For example, on the difficult issue of NLRB declination, our supreme court held in Russell v. Electrical
W orkers14 that, while resort to the NLRB should not be required when it would obviously be futile, the party seeking
relief in a state court bears the burden of showing that the
NLRB, on the basis of published rules and decisions, would
decline to take the case.
During 1968 the supreme court had occasion to amplify the
Russell rule in two companion cases: Musicians Union v.
Supreme Courtl& and Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical
Stage Employees Union Local 16. 16 Both cases involved injunctions against threatened union picketing to protest an
employer's refusal to hire workmen whom the employer said he
did not want or need.
In the first case, Charles Finley, owner of the Oakland
Athletics baseball club, proposed to hire a union organist and
a 25-piece union band for the opening game between· the
Athletics and the Baltimore Orioles, but the musicians union
insisted that he employ a union band at all weekend games, as
was the practice of other professional teams in the area. When
Finley refused, the union denied its members permission to
perform, placed pickets at the entrances to' the Oakland
Coliseum, and threatened to continue picketing on opening
night. Finley and the Coliseum obtained a temporary restraining order, and thereafter a preliminary injunction, restraining picketing at the Coliseum for any purpose relating to
the hiring of musicians by Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. or
others. The supreme court granted an alternative writ of
prohibition restraining further proceedings in the action on
the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue
the injunction; and, after argument, the court ordered the issuance of a pre-emptory writ.
Finley and the Coliseum advanced several reasons for
14. 64 Cal.2d 22, 48 Cal. Rptr. 702,
409 P.2d 926 (1966).
15. 69 Cal.2d - , 73 Cal. Rptr. 201,
447 P.2d 313 (1968).
542
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16. 69 Ca1.2d - , 73 Cal. Rptr. 213,
447 P.2d 325 (1968).

4

Grodin: Labor Relations

Labor Relations

avoiding the pre-emption doctrine, each of which the supreme
court rejected. First they argued that the operations of a
baseball club, even though crossing state lines, should be
regarded as outside the scope of the federal act by analogy
to baseball's exemption from federal antitrust regulations. But
the court held that exemption is based upon a judicial-legislative history peculiar to the antitrust field and has no application to the field of labor regulation, either by way of constitutional limitation or congressional intent.
Nor was the court prepared to speculate, as did respondents,
that the NLRB would choose to decline jurisdiction over a
baseball club. While it was true that the board had never
asserted jurisdiction over a baseball club, it was also true that
it had never declined to do so by "rule of decision" or "published rule" within the meaning of section 14 ( c ) . While it had
declined to assert jurisdiction over some segments of the
sports and entertainment industries it had asserted jurisdiction,
particularly in more recent cases, over others. Thus, since
there had been no prior resort to the NLRB, Finley and the
Coliseum failed to sustain the burden, placed upon them by
Russell, of establishing that the board would not hear the
cause.
Even if the NLRB would assert jurisdiction over the business operations of the Oakland Atheltics, it was argued, the
pre-emption principle is inapplicable because the threatened
picketing by the union, which had no prior dealings with the
ball club and which represented none of its current employees,
was simply outside the scope of the Act, either by way of
protection or prohibition. But, as the court pointed out, the
Act's definition of "employee" includes any employee, and
not only the employees of a particular employer /7 and its
definition of "labor dispute" includes "any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
17. LMRA § 2(3).
CAL. L.AW 1969
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employer and employee.,,18 Thus with reference to the objective sought, the union's picketing to obtain employment
opportunity for its members, while not prohibited by section
8 of the Act, was "arguably" protected as a "concerted
activity" for employees' "mutual aid or protection" under
section 7. 19 At the same time, the means by which the
picketing was conducted, according to the allegations of one
complaint, "arguably" violated the secondary boycott proscriptions in section 8 by failing to conform to the board's
requirements for picketing a "situs" occupied by both a "primary" employer (Finley) and a "neutral" or "secondary" employer (Coliseum), and thereby illegally inducing a secondary
work stoppage. Whether the picketing was in fact protected or prohibited was a question for the NLRB, not the
state court, to determine.
Finley and the Coliseum next contended that the injunction
was justified without reference to the pre-emption doctrine on
the ground that it was necessary to protect public safety and
order against the turmoil that would ensue if picketing were
allowed, particularly on opening night. On this issue the
court's opinion was most emphatic:
The fact that holding the game in the face of the picketing
might pose a threat to public safety and order does not
convert peaceful picketing that the state may not enjoin
into "the kind of mass picketing and overt threats of
violence which under the Allen-Bradley local case give
The picketing,
the state court jurisdiction".
peaceful in itself, would have caused the ensuing turmoil
no more than Finley's decision to hold the game would
have. It was for the Board, therefore, to regulate the
economic struggle between Finley and petitioners. 2o

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/20

18. 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(9).
19. While § 8(b)(6) of the Act proscribes union activity to obtain payment "in the nature of an exaction, for
services which are not performed or not
to be performed" that language has
been held not to extend to demands that
544
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workmen be employed, even though the
employer regards their work as redundant. NLRB v. Gamble Enterprises, 345 U.S. 117, 97 L.Ed. 864, 73
S.Ct. 560 (1953).
20. 69 Cal.2d at - , 73 Cal. Rptr. at
211, 447 P.2d at 323.
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Finally, it was asserted that the court had jurisdiction to
issue the injunction in order to prevent trespass upon the property of the Coliseum. It was on this issue that the court's
opinion broke new ground for California. This question had
been before the United States Supreme Court in Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats.l In this case the court
struck down an injunction against picketing which was arguably prohibited by the Act, and therefore not subject to state
court jurisdiction, even though one of the grounds for the
injunction had been that the picketing trespassed upon the
employer's property; but at the same time the court left open
the question of "whether a state may frame and enforce an
injunction aimed narrowly at a trespass of this sort.,,2
Several state courts have answered this question in the
negative, on the ground that the trespass issue is inextricably
related to board jurisdiction, and California now joins that
company. "There may be circumstances", the court concedes,
"in which the use of trespass laws in labor c6ntroversies would
reach activities that would have 'no relevance to the board's
function' " but in the instant case, where the injunction relies
upon the law of trespass, "not to ensure public safety and
order, but to institute ground rules governing the economic
struggle betweeen the union and the real parties in interest",
it trespasses upon the jurisdiction of the board. This is so
because "the propriety of labor activity on private property has
been a persistent issue in disputes before the Board, and the
Board has the power in appropriate cases to authorize such
activity. ,,3
Consolidated Theatres, involved a quite similar pre-emption
issue: whether a state court had jurisdiction to enjoin picketing by the Stagehands Union to compel a moving picture
theatre, when showing first-run pictures, to hire a maintenance
man whom the theatre said it did not want or need. The
court found the picketing to be arguably protected under
1. 353 U.S. 20, 1 L.Ed.2d 613, 77
S.Ct. 604 (1957) reh. den. 353 U.S.
948, 1 L.Ed.2d 857, 77 S.Ct. 822 (1957).

35
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2. 353 U.S. at 24, 1 L.Ed.2d at 616,
77 S.Ct. at 606.
3. 69 Cal.2d at - , 73 Cal. Rptr. at
212, 447 P.2d at 324.
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section 7 of the Act, not only because it was designed to
create additional employment opportunities for members, (as
in the Musicians Union case) but also because it served to
protect existing jobs at other theatres against the threat by
the owners of those theatres to eliminate maintenance men
unless all first-run theatres were signed to the same requirement. The court also found the picketing to be arguably prohibited by section 8(b)(6) of the Act, on the basis of evidence
that maintenance men who were "employed" did little or no
actual work. 311
On the basis of the Russell rule, these findings provided
sufficient basis to overturn the injunction unless the theatre had
demonstrated through published regulations and decisions that
the board would decline to assert jurisdiction; the court refused to apply the Russell rule because the union did not
raise the pre-emption argument at the trial level, and the transcript was totally lacking in evidence on that point. It therefore remanded the case for trial, with instructions that it be
dismissed if Consolidated does not bear its burden of showing
board declination.
Collective Bargaining Agreements and Arbitration

Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act gives federal courts
jurisdiction over suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization which represents employees
in an industry "affecting commerce" as defined in the Act; and,
as previously noted, it has been held that state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction in such cases, subject to the application of federal law.
Section 301 includes the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate and of arbitration awards,4 matters which are covered
extensively by California's Arbitration Act. 6 This Act pre·
scribes the procedure for bringing peti tions to compel arbitration, or to confirm, modify, or set aside arbitration awards.
It includes time limits within which such action can be taken,
3a. See footnote 19, supra, page 544.
4. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 972, 77 S.Ct.
912 (1957).
546
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§§

1280-

8

Labor Relations
Grodin: Labor Relations

and also specifies the grounds upon which the petition should
be granted or denied. There is serious question whether the
Arbitration Act applies in cases subject to section 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act. So far that question has not been
squarely considered by the courts; indeed, it has been largely
ignored.
For example, under federal principles, an order to arbitrate
a grievance is not to be denied "unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."6 Courts
are precluded from inquiring into the merits of a dispute.
Moreover, the Supreme Court held in John Wiley & Sons v.
Livingston7 that so-called "procedural" issues, such as whether
contractual grievance procedures leading to arbitration have
been complied with, or excused, or whether unexcused failure
to comply avoids the duty to arbitrate, cannot ordinarily be
answered without consideration of the merits and should,
therefore, be referred to the arbitrator.
The California Arbitration Act is generally in accord with
these principles, but section 1281.2 provides, inter alia, that
an order to arbitrate should be denied if the court determines
that the right to compel arbitration has been waived by the
petitioner.
In Martinez Typographical Union v. Silversun Corp.s a
union sought to compel arbitration of a dispute,9 but the
trial court denied relief on the basis of waiver, finding that the
union had failed to request arbitration for a substantial period
of time, even after notice that the company was about to sell
its business. The union remained silent until after the sale
had been consummated and the company no longer had the
physical facilities with which to comply with the union's demand. On appeal, the union argued that the question of
6. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 4
L.Ed.2d 1409, 80 S.Ct. 1347 (1960).
7. 376 U.S. 543, 11 L.Ed.2d 898, 84
S.Ct. 909 (1964).
8. 256 Cal. App.2d 255, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 760, (1967).

9. The dispute was over the union's
contention that under the applicable
collective bargaining agreement the employer was obligated to pay typographers for certain make-work duties.

CAL LAW 1969
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waiver was so related to the merits of the dispute that it would
be inconsistent with federal principles, as declared in Wiley, to
deny arbitration. The appellate court rejected the claim of
inconsistency, however, on the basis of a statement in Wiley
that a union "might abandon its right to arbitration by failing
to make its claims known";lo and it affirmed the trial court's
ruling, stating that under section 1281.2, the question of
waiver was one of fact for the trial court to determine.
It may be that it is not inconsistent in principle with
federal law, as interpreted in Wiley, to allow waiver, in the
sense of "abandonment" as a defense in an action to compel
arbitration, and it may be that in the context of the particular
facts of Silversun a finding of waiver, in that sense, did not
conflict with any federal policy. But if the notion of federal
uniformity is to have any meaning, then the definition of what
constitutes "waiver", or "abandonment", must be regarded
as ultimately a federal issue. For example, a defense based
upon the failure of the party seeking arbitration to comply with
contractual time limits in processing the grievance poses precisely the type of issue which the Supreme Court in Wiley held
must be referred to arbitration; and for a state court to hold
that such non-compliance constituted "waiver" of the right to
arbitrate would be contrary to federal policy. Thus, the
appellate court's characterization of the waiver issue as one of
fact for the trial court, without reference to federal principles,
could not be sustained.
Assertion of Individual Rights under a Labor Agreement

What might be regarded as a sub-category of section 301
actions, and in any event closely related to them, are those
cases in which a member of a bargaining unit seeks relief
against his union, his employer, or both on the ground that
he was wrongfully denied some benefit under a collective
bargaining agreement.
In Vaca v. Sipes,11 the Supreme Court held that such
10. 376 U.S. at 551, II L.Ed.2d at
905, 84 S Ct at - .
548
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actions are maintainable in federal or state courts as section
301 actions, without regard to potential NLRB jurisdiction.
However, to succeed in the face of a defense that he has
failed to exhaust contractual arbitration remedies, an employee must prove that the union, as bargaining agent,
breached its duty of fair representation in its handling of the
employee's grievance. 12 And to do that, he must demonstrate that the union's conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory,
or in bad faith.
Vaca v. Sipes involved a union's refusal to process an employee's grievance beyond the labor-management grievance
machinery to third-party arbitration. Last year in Pratt v.
Local 683,13 a California court applied the doctrine of that
case to rescue from summary judgment and demurrer a
complaint which alleged that the plaintiff's union had processed his wrongly discharged grievance through the second
step of the grievance procedure, but had done so in an incompetent manner, resulting at that point in a unanimous
decision against him by the grievance committee. That, in
itself, would be insufficient to state a cause of action under
federal rules, but the complaint also alleged that the union
acted "wilfully and in bad faith", and affidavits filed on the
motion for summary judgment alleged personal animosity on
the part of the union representative. Though the complaint
was filed prior to the decision in Vaca, the appellate court
held that these allegations were sufficient to create a factual
issue under the rule of that case, in a cause of action against
the union and its representative, and overruled the summary
judgment which had been granted by the trial court. At the
same time, the appellate court reversed judgment on a demurrer to a cause of action against the employer for wrongful
discharge, stating that plaintiff should be given an opportunity
to reframe his complaint under the Vaca rule against the employer as well.
12. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 89 L.Ed.
173,65 S.Ct. 226 (1944).

13. 260 Cal. App.2d 545, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 483 (1968).
CAL LAW 1969
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Plaintiffs in Archuleta v. Grand Lodge 14 did not fare as
well. They had been employed by Douglas Aircraft Company
at its EI Segundo plant, in a bargaining unit represented by the
International Association of Machinists. The work was transferred to the company's Long Beach plant, where it was
being performed by employees in a bargaining unit represented
by a different union, and they were terminated as a result.
The lAM filed a grievance on their behalf, claiming that the
work transfer was in violation of the applicable collective bargaining agreement, and the grievance was processed to thirdparty arbitration; but the arbitrator sustained the company's
position that no violation had occurred.
After some abortive litigation and several amended complaints, plaintiffs, suing pro per, filed a complaint which alleged
that the arbitration award was the product of fraud and collusion between the company and the union, and that on the
merits they were entitled to relief. Both the company and the
union were named as defendants, but only the union. was
served, and the company did not appear. The union's demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, and the employees appealed.
The appellate court treated the complaint as a petition to
set aside an arbitration award, or alternatively to obtain
money damages against the union for fraud. As to the first
theory, the court held the plaintiffs had not met the requirements of the California Arbitration Act, providing that a
petition to set aside an arbitration award must be brought
by a party to the arbitration proceeding, and must be filed
within 100 days of service of the award. 16 (The action before
the court was instituted three years after service of the award
on the union.) As to the second theory, the court held the
complaint failed to allege the essential elements of fraud under
the California law, and it affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
While the result may be defensible, the decision is defective in a number of respects, primarily in its assumption
that the issue was resolvable under the state law without regard
14. 262 Cal. App.2d 202, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 694 (1968).
550
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to federal
precedent.
one against the union for damages arising out of an alleged
breach of its duty of fair representation, under the doctrine
of Vaca v. Sipes. The provision of the California Arbitration
Act to the effect that only parties to an arbitration proceeding
may petition to set aside an award clearly cannot be applied
to preclude relief in such a situation consistent with federal
law. Moreover, since the company was not joined as defendant, and since it was a necessary party to any action to
set aside the arbitration award between it and the union, the
court's consideration of the action as being in part for that
purpose was unnecessary. Indeed, it may be that joinder of
the company is required under Vaca, but leaving that issue
aside the questions were, or should have been, whether the
complaint was timely filed and, if so, whether it alleged with
sufficient specificity the elements of a breach of statutory duty
by the union in the process of obtaining the award.
On the timeliness issue, the federal act contains no statute
of limitations, and it has been held that resort to California's
three-year limitation period on suits to enforce statutory rights
is proper. IS It is difficult to determine from the court's opinion
whether that test was met. Although the suit was filed within
three years after the date of service of the arbitration award,
the acts complained of presumably preceded the award itself.
It is also difficult to determine from the opinion whether the
allegations were sufficient to meet federal standards under
Vaca, since they are not set forth in detail; the most that can
be said is that the court's analysis in terms of fraud pleadings
should not have been determinative.

Public Employees

Governmental bodies are expressly excluded from coverage
under the Taft-Hartley Act, and it is here that there is the
greatest room, and the greatest need, for legal creativity at
the state level. Unfortunately, the quality of public dis16. International U. of Op. Eng. v.
Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 350 F.2d 936,
19 A.L.R.3d 1026 (1965), cert. den.

384 U.S. 904, 16 L.Ed.2d 358, 86 S.Ct.
1336.
CAL LAW 1969
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cussion in this area is often distorted by an overemphasis upon
the right-to-strike issue. Whatever is eventually decided on
the right of public employees to strike, still an unsettled question under California law,17 it is doubtful that any effective
means can be found to deter public employees from quitting
their jobs and picketing when they become sufficiently dissatisfied with their conditions of employment to do SO.18 What
is of at least equal signficance is the legal-institutional context
in which disputes between such employees and their employers
may be resolved, for it is that context, more than rules relating
to the legality of strikes, which is likely to determine whether
work stoppages will in fact occur.
The principal obstacle to effective labor relations within
the public sector has been the dogma that public employment
is unique, and that principles from the private sector cannot
or should not be applied. There are differences, to be sure,
but these are often exaggerated. The modern trend is toward extending the institutions, attitudes, and techniques
which have been developed in private industry to government
employees.
California has responded to these changes, but slowly. In
1961 the legislature adopted Chapter 10 of the Government
Code,I9 which, in language reminiscent of LMRA, declares
the right of public employees to form, join, and participate in
the activities of employee organizations of their own choosing
for the purpose of representation on all matters of employeremployee relations, and the right of such organizations to
represent "their members" in such matters. The chapter
prohibited public agencies from interfering with these rights,
and required them "to meet and confer" upon request of employee organizations and to consider "as fully as (they) deem
reasonable" such presentations as are made by the employee
organizations on behalf of its members prior to arriving at a
determination. However, no provision was made for selection
17. See In re Berry, 68 Cal.2d 137,
65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273 (1968).
For a further discussion of this case,
see York, REMEDIES, and Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, in this volume.
552
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19. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 3500 et seq.
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of bargaining
representatives,
or for exclusive representation.
It was unclear to what extent the obligation of an agency to
"meet and confer" implied good faith negotiations leading to
an agreement, as distinguished from the unilateral consideration of proposals; and no machinery was created for dealing
with disputes. Moreover, the statutory declaration of purpose
contained an exceedingly ambiguous sentence to the effect that
nothing in the statute was to be deemed to supersede "the
provisions of existing state law and the charters, ordinances,
and rules of local public agencies which establish and regulate
a merit or civil service system or which provide for other
methods of administering employer-employee relations."2o
Through amendments to Chapter 10 adopted in 1968, the
legislature clarified the situation somewhat for employees of
public bodies other than the state. Public agencies are now
expressly required, except in cases of emergency, to notify
employee organizations of proposed action affecting their
members to give them an opportunity to meet in advance. The
phrase "meet and confer" was changed to "meet and confer
in good faith", and the latter defined to mean "the mutual
obligation personally to meet and confer in order to exchange
freely information, opinions, and proposals, and to endeavor
to reach agreement on matters within the scope of representation". If agreement is not reached, the parties may agree
upon a mediator, and share the costs of mediation.
Prior to the amendments, the statute authorized public
agencies to adopt reasonable rules and regulations for the
administration of employer-employee relations under Chapter
10, and enumerated several subjects which were covered.
Under the 1968 amendments, the rules and regulations may
be adopted only after "consultation in good faith" with employee organization representatives, and the list of suggested
topics is expanded to include recognition of employee organizations and additional procedures for the resolution of disputes involving "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment.,,1
20. Cal. Gov. Code § 3500.

1. Cal. Gov. Code § 3505.
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While the 1968 amendments are an improvement, they
still leave important questions unanswered. The most critical
of these is the representation issue: a governmental employer
is now required to confer in good faith with a "recognized employee organization" but that term is defined redundantly to
mean one "which has been formally acknowledged by the
public agency as an employee organization that represents
employees of the public agency", 2 and no standards are provided for determining when such acknowledgment should be
granted or withheld. If the legislature contemplated that more
than one employee organization might be recognized in the
same unit of employees, then the bargaining process becomes
exceedingly complicated. If the legislature contemplated that
only one employee organization would be recognized for each
bargaining unit, as in the case of private industry, then public
agencies must improvise, for the statute provides no criteria
for determining what units are appropriate, nor for determining whether a particular employee organization in fact
represents a majority of employees in a particular unit.
In the case of teachers, special legislation known as the
Winton Ace attempts to resolve the representation issue
through establishment of "negotiating councils" composed of
delegates from each teacher organization, the number of
delegates being determined by the number of members. In
Berkeley Teachers Association v. Berkeley Federation of
Teachers4 decided last year, the Winton Act was interpreted
to preclude the conduct of an election to determine the proportionate representation of each organization. The court
held that representation was to be determined on the basis
of membership rosters alone. An election to require the
teachers to choose, the court ruled, would amount to an
"unwarranted interference with the relationship between the
employee organization and its members"; and it expressly
rejected the argument that the act was designed to adapt
private sector labor law to the public sector. It is apparent
2. Cal. Gov. Code § 3501(b).
3. Cal. Education Code §§ 1308013088; Cal. Gov. Code § 3501.
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4. 254 Cal. App.2d 660, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 515 (1967).
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Labor Relationswill eventually be required in the public
that further
sector, for the situation at present is too ambiguous to be
workable. Meanwhile, it can be expected that the current
ambiguity will give rise to ample decisional material for next
year's Trends and Developments .

...
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